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Abstract
Through the introduction of a comparative party-state model, I will first
demonstrate that due to specific structural and dynamic constraints, the
capacity of party-states to learn is both limited and uneven. Differences in the
room for manoeuvre are defined by structural and dynamic specifics of power
distribution. These will determine the invariable implementation of structure-
specific instruments of resource extraction and distribution and their
escalation under external pressure no matter the requirements of adaptation.
Accelerated implementation of structure-specific instruments leads to
different paths of self-destruction rather than adaptation. Adaptation is
therefore structurally constrained and self-consuming in party-states. Second,
these theoretical arguments will be empirically demonstrated through the
economic policy efforts to adapt to market pressures in three radically
different party-states ￿ Romania, Hungary by the end of the 1980s and China
from early 1990s.
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Az ￿sszehasonl￿t￿ pÆrtÆllami modell bevezetØsØvel elősz￿r azt mutatom
be, hogy specifikus szerkezeti Øs dinamikai korlÆtok miatt a pÆrtÆllamok
tanulÆsi kØpessØge behatÆrolt Øs nem egyforma. A mozgÆstØrbeli eltØrØ-
seket a hatalmi eloszlÆs szerkezeti Øs dinamikai sajÆtossÆgai befolyÆsol-
jÆk. Ezek kØnyszer￿tik ki a szerkezet-konform erőforrÆs-szerző Øs
-eloszt￿ eszk￿z￿k ismØtelt alkalmazÆsÆt Øs ezek eszkalÆl￿dÆsÆt k￿lső
nyomÆs hatÆsÆra, az alkalmazkodÆs k￿vetelmØnyeitől f￿ggetlen￿l. A
szerkezet-konform eszk￿z￿k bevetØsØnek n￿vekvő gyakorisÆga vezet az ￿n-
puszt￿tÆs eltØrő pÆlyÆira. Az alkalmazkodÆs a pÆrtÆllamok esetØben tehÆt
szerkezetileg behatÆrolt Øs ￿nfelemØsztő. Az elmØleti Ørvek helytÆll￿sÆgÆt a
gyakorlatban hÆrom radikÆlisan eltØrő pÆrtÆllam piaci alkalmazkodÆsi t￿-
rekvØsØn kereszt￿l mutatom be. Az orszÆgok: RomÆnia Øs MagyarorszÆg az
1980-as Øvek vØgØtől Øs K￿na az 1990-es Øvek elejØtől.
                    
A kutatÆst az OTKA Øs a Ford Alap￿tvÆny pekingi rØszlege finansz￿rozta1
Extensive comparative literature deals with the puzzle of the extraordinary
economic development in China confronted with the precipitous economic
decline of the East European and Soviet party-states and the problems of
transformation. Scholars frequently point to the rewards of gradual and
experimental nature of reforms rather than that of shock in nature.
Similarly, they refer to the payoffs of reforms coming from below as
opposed to central ones. They stress the benefits of the strategy of carrying
out economic transformation prior political ones and to the advantages of
mastering reforms under authoritarian conditions rather than in democratic
ones. If all these factors prove to be reasonable, than why did other party-
states not use China’s strategy? What is the room for manoeuvre for
economic policy leaders to implement ideal strategies? Through the
introduction of a comparative party-state model, I will first demonstrate that
due to specific structural and dynamic constraints, the capacity of party-states
to learn is both limited and uneven. Differences in the room for manoeuvre
are defined by structural and dynamic specifics of power distribution. These
will determine the invariable implementation of structure-specific instruments
of resource extraction and distribution and their escalation under external
pressure. Accelerated implementation of structure-specific instruments leads
to different paths of self-destruction rather than adaptation. Adaptation is
therefore structurally constrained and self-consuming in party-states. Second,
these theoretical arguments will be empirically demonstrated through the
economic policy efforts to adapt to market pressures in three radically
different party-states ￿ Romania, Hungary by the end of the 1980s, and China
from early 1990s.
THE INTERACTIVE PARTY-STATE MODEL
2
The theoretical starting point for this paper is the introduction of the
Interactive Party-state model as an explanatory device for interpreting the
operation and transformation of any communist party-state
3. Interactivity is
                    
2 See in detail in  Maria CsanÆdi A comparative Model of Party-states: the Stuctural
Reasons Behind Similarities and differences in Self-reproduction, Reforms and
Transformation Institute of Economics Working Papers, Budapest MT-DP 2004/7
3 Maria CsanÆdi, Party-states and their Legacies in Post-communist Transformation
(Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, Ma, US, Edward Elgar, 1997; CsanÆdi, Maria, A
comparative model of party-states: the structural reasons behind similarities and2
central to this explanation because it concentrates on the inner workings of the
party-state and highlights the interaction of individual and institutional
interests and behavior defined by a characteristic structural setting. The
comparative model postulates a self-similar
4 character for the structure and
operation of party-states along different dimensions and identifies the
structural reasons behind the differences among party-states.
The distinctiveness of a party-state structure evolves through the direct
connections between party and state, politics and the state-owned economy
5
both institutionally and on the level of individual actors (Figure 1).
Direct connections arise via the power instruments of the party. We call these
instruments as inter-linking dependency lines
6 (D2). These inter-linking lines
penetrate non-party institutions and directly influence decisions by
overlapping positional-, organizational-, activity structure and individual
behavior. These specifics render the political nature of dependencies and
interest promotion possibilities for those connected to these lines. Inter-
linking lines produce structurally built-in inequalities among those connected
to interlinking lines and those lacking connection. It makes also possible the
deeper political integration of strategic actors that ￿ by meeting priority
criteria of politically rational concerns ￿ are able to short cut the decision-
making process within and across party and state hierarchies at any level.
With shortcuts another structurally built in inequality will emerge.
                                                                                                                                              
differences in self-reproduction, reforms and transformation, Manuscript, Institute of
Economics (2003).
4 Maria CsanÆdi, Maria and Andras Lőrincz (1992), ￿Neural Network Formalization of
the Hungarian Party-state System￿, Behavioral Science, Vol. 37, N 2, (1992), 81-
108.
5 Not only state owned economy is directly connected to the party. The same direct con-
nection is true for other sub-spheres and levels of the society: culture, politics, edu-
cation, healthcare, civil society, social movements, mass movements, executive legal
and judicial decisions, procurator, police apparatus, etc. These sub-spheres for the sake
of simplicity, are "condensed" in the concept of the non-party ￿ state ￿ hierarchy.
6 The inter-linking lines infiltrating the institutional framework of non-party institutions
are the following: nomenklatura system overlapping decisions through position
structure in non-party organizations, the subject-matter responsibility system over-
lapping decisions through activity structure, the instructor system, overlapping deci-
sions through the organization structure, the party membership, overlapping indi-
viduals through party discipline (CsanÆdi, 1997, 2003).3
Key:
S State (non-party) hierarchy
P Party hierarchy
An Decision-makers (actors) at the n
th level of the structure
D1 Direction of intra-hierarchy dependence
D2 Direction of cross-hierarchy dependence
I1 Path of intra-hierarchy interest promotion
I2 Path of cross-hierarchy interest promotion
I3 Direction of feedbacks
Figure 1 Power structure of the party-state system and the perspective
of decision makers (actors, An.) on various levels on the
possible paths of interest promotion (from ’a’ to ’i’.)4
Inequality emerges since through shortcuts actors are able to directly promote
their interest and resist to disadvantageous decisions by encountering
decision-makers whom otherwise, considering their formal position in the
hierarchy, would never meet
7.  Shortcuts use D1 and D2 dependency lines as
loops to feed back achieved results through the shortcuts therefore, they are a
form of structural feedback
8. The result of unequal interest promotion and
resistance possibilities through I2  and I3  is that bargaining capacities and
formal positions differ.
They comprise the structural background of connecting and operating
principles of party-states. Concerning the connecting principles:
interlinking threads (as instruments of party power) may origin only in the
party hierarchy, and consequently, cross hierarchy feedbacks that use
interlinking dependency lines as loops may origin only in the state
hierarchy. These rules provide the basis for the operating principles: for the
politically monopolized dependencies, politically monopolized interest
promotion, as well as politically monopolized resource extraction and
redistribution. These specifics also contribute to the politically rational
motivation and subsequent behavior of actors that are being simultaneously
exposed to and holding dependency lines within the structure. These
characteristics furnish the unique institutional interactivity of politics and
other spheres at the level of individual decision-making.
The different bargaining capacities of actors simultaneously captured by and
holding dependency lines emerge from built-in inequalities due to the
distribution of inter-linking lines, feedbacks and the unequal distribution of
resource-extracting capacities. These inequalities result in different resource
attracting, extracting, distribution and resisting capacities of the actors within
the net exposed and holding dependency lines. The balance of these capacities
will conclude in selectively hard or soft constraints of self-reproduction that
within the system forge the dynamics of the structure, motivating actors’
behaviour.
Elements, principles of connection of these elements, and principles of
operation and the subsequent motivations and behaviour have a self-similar
character.  This self-similarity will prevail no matter the time, the space, the
                    
7 For example it may occur within the hierarchies: if an enterprise manager is invited to
a ministerial session, or a local party secretary becomes member of the Central
Committee of the Party (CC), or across hierarchies: if an enterprise manager or local
government leader becomes member of the CC.
8 See about structural feedbacks in detail in CsanÆdi, 1997, pp. 28-37.5
levels of aggregation and the conditions of the structure
9.  Differences emerge
within the self-similar properties due to the different distribution of the origin,
extent and depth of inter-linking threads, locus of origin, level and place of arrival
and density of feedbacks acquired and the different distribution of resource
extraction and allocation capacities along the administrative levels of the structure.
The combination of these differences will define the differences in the distribution
of actors with soft or hard reproduction constraints and accordingly, the variations
in the distribution of power. Soft and hard reproduction constraints are selective
related to structural specifics. The distribution of the selectivity changes according
to the dynamics of reproduction and change of the structure at different
aggregations and conditions, and vice-versa, the dynamics of the selectivity will be
reflected in the dynamics of power distribution.
Concluding from the above, budget constraints
10 if nested in power relations will
acquire critical functions concerning the conditions of self-reproduction of the net,
therefore, we shall call it as reproduction constraints. In this context, if confronted
by Kornai￿s arguments on budget constraints, reproduction constraints is a
structural-systemic rather than a political-economic term; it is selectively soft
according to the distribution of power rather than soft in general. Due to the
existence of selective softness, selective hardness of reproduction constraints also
exists. The extent of softness or hardness depends on the combination of the
extracting, attracting allocating and resisting capacity of the unit within the given
power relation. The dynamics of its elements will influence the tendency towards
the softening or hardening of the reproduction constraints. Softness or hardness of
reproduction constraints concerns self-similar units, not only state-owned
enterprises. Softness or hardness may vary in time, in space and different
aggregation levels and conditions of the structure. Reproduction constraints
strongly interact with budget constraints that emerge in the relationship of the net
to the environment external to the net. The impact of budget constraints in
economic sense on the reproduction of the party-state network varies according to
the combination of hardness and softness of reproduction and budget constraints.
Status quo within the net is preserved (remain soft) if budget constraints are soft,
adaptation pressures increase and cohesion of the net declines if reproduction
constraints and budget constraints are simultaneously persistently hard. Let us see
the variations of the dynamics of self-reproduction and its constraints in different
distributions of power.
                    
9 This is the reason why we can use this model as an analytical tool at any aggregation
level of the party-state structure.
10  See Kornai, 19816
THE MAIN PATTERNS OF REPRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION:
Development and transformations of party-states may be grouped from the
point of view of the self-reproduction of the system, according to the
specifics of the distribution of power and its adequate dynamics.
The distribution of power includes three major structural factors: (1) the
distribution of inter-linking threads, (2) the existence of structural
feedbacks (shortcuts) from economic field and (3) the distribution of the
discretion on extraction and allocation of resources in the administrative
structure. Three major patterns are given upon the variation of the above
elements: (i) Self-exploiting, (ii) Self-disintegrating and (iii) Self-
withdrawing.
These factors will determine the different frequency of hardening
reproduction constraint within the pattern, according to its specifics of
resisting and attracting capacity within the net. The larger is the resisting
and attracting capacity within the net the more frequently will the self-
reproduction process run into resource constraints and suffer loss of
cohesion in the given distribution of power. Therefore, frequency increases
from Self-exploiting through Self-disintegrating towards Self-withdrawing
patterns. These structural patterns will also determine the possible measures
for resource extraction and distribution to restore cohesion and thereby the
different ways of self-reproduction: forced resource redeployment, resource
revealing reforms and resource creating reforms respectively. Conversely,
the impact of the specific way of reproduction on the structure results in
characteristic disintegration, collapse and transformation of the system.
Disintegration, collapse and transformation will occur in different sequence
and pace according to the specifics of the pattern of power distribution.
Hardening reproduction constraints decrease cohesion and increase the
frequency of implementing pattern conform measures that further increase
tensions, the decentralization, the disintegration and the self-withdrawal of
the party-state net according to the specifics of the given patterns.7
Table 1: Basic patterns of power distribution in party-states






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When hardening reproduction constraints meet persistent external pressures
due to hard budget constraints, the pattern-conform process will accelerate.
Acceleration of these processes due to external pressures will escalate the
implementation of pattern conform measures that further increase tensions,
disintegration and withdrawal and decline the cohesion of the structure.
Adaptation will be self-destructive in all patterns, in other words, party-states
learning capacity is limited by structural and dynamic constraints. The way of
self-destruction however will be different according to the dynamics of the
patterns. Patterns will also have a substantial imprint on the character of the
transformation: in the level of uncertainty and turmoil, the possible pace of
reforms, the length of economic crisis, the time-span to restore equilibrium,
the adaptability of the society etc.
In the following section I will shortly demonstrate the last phase of the
party-state period in Romania, Hungary and China, as examples of the Self-
exploiting, Self-disintegrating and Self-withdrawing patterns respectively
11.
I will show that in all three cases, when competitive external pressures in-
creased parallel to hardening reproduction constraints within the net the
implementation of pattern-conform measures became more intensive and
more frequent. Second, non-pattern-conform measures ￿ conservative or re-
form oriented ￿ were soon form-fitted to power relations. Third, even de-
spite disintegration, interests and politically rational behavior prevailed
within the remaining net.  I shall describe how did tensions mount in Roma-
nia when reproduction and budget constraints simultaneously hardened and
how did it lead to social explosion; how did the same international conditions
lead to accelerated disintegration and transformation in Hungary; Why did the
interplay of internal and external conditions of the net lead to the absolute
shrinking of the net and to the growing field outside of it in China.
HISTORICAL SETTING
By the second half of the 1970s, the accumulating debts, the increased
interests and simultaneous pressures on the members (units) of the Soviet
block to repay loans hardened their budget constraints toward the West.
Developments resulted in the re-exposure of bloc members to Soviet resource
allocation. The Soviet Union, in turn, was entrapped between the growing
allocation expectancies of those who were fed back within its own net, the
allocation pressures exerted by the increasingly exposed block member states,
                    
11 Detailed justification why these countries pertain to the given patterns may be found
in (CsanÆdi, 2003).9
and its declined extracting capacity due to internal (national and bloc level
aggregation and external (Western) resistance to contribute resources. These
circumstances hardened reproduction constraints both within all units
including the Soviet Union and within the bloc as the larger aggregation.
Persistent hardening of domestic and bloc reproduction constraints parallel to
hardening budget constraints in relation to the West strongly influenced
Gorbachev￿s strategy within the bloc. He first made steps to raise resource
extraction through stricter state level coordination of domestic production,
direct investment contributions and encouragement of enterprise level
connections among bloc states. His efforts in the larger aggregation, however,
were resisted, in part because lower level units, facing their own hardening
reproduction constraints were unwilling and unable to contribute
12.
The simultaneous hardening of reproduction constraints within the higher
level unit, within the subordinated units and within the larger aggregation it-
self led to accelerated self-withdrawal (absolute shrinking) of the net in the
bloc ￿ of which Gorbachev was active promoter. The lifting of pressure by
the larger unit within the larger aggregation dissipated the political capital of
the sub-units, and this gave way to system collapses and transformation char-
acteristic of the individual patterns both in Romania and Hungary. China was
not directly influenced by those macro-conditions. The hardening
reproduction constraints parallel to hardening budget constraints external to
the net and thereby the acceleration of structure-conform measures emerged
from the specifics of the Chinese party-state network and its dynamics from
early 1990s.
ADAPTATION EFFORTS IN A SELF-EXPLOITING PATTERN:  THE EXAMPLE
OF ROMANIA
Hard currency debts have been accumulating all over Eastern Europe with
similar difficulties of debt servicing. Poland was the first to negotiate a
moratorium and Hungary and Yugoslavia also achieved extensions on their
loans. Ceausescu found more resistance to obtain this extension as a
consequence of his fading popularity in the international realm, driving him
to domestic solutions. Moreover, the opposition to further extraction within
the Self-exploiting structure was repressible. Due to these factors,
Ceausescu decided to accelerate loan repayments instead of extending
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them, accompanied by a campaign against ￿financial banking oligarchy￿
and ￿financial imperialism￿.
13
THE FURTHER DECLINE OF COHESION AND ESCALATION OF FORCED RESOURCE
REDEPLOYMENT  MEASURES
Decision on repayments provoked intensified extraction drives within the
net, and thereby, the  escalation of structure-conforming measures with
intensified coercion and mobilization. Besides increasing internal
pressures, Ceausescu shifted the emphasis of resource attraction efforts
from outside the net to the larger bloc aggregation, the CMEA.
Reorientation was further motivated by the negative balance of trade with
oil producing developing countries. This has driven Bucharest to call for
CMEA ’self-reliance’ on energy and raw material sources, giving up hard
currency imports from third countries. In 1983, the share of communist
countries had risen from 40.5 in 1980 to some 53 percent. The shift
however was very expensive: the Soviets showed little inclination to oblige
and Bucharest had to pay for the oil in hard currency or in products of high
economic value
14.
Desperate resource attraction was extended to any opportunity. For
example, in 1983 conflicts developed with the West over the heightening
fees of emigration of Jews and Germans
15. Ceausescu finally conceded to
Western pressure, and negotiations ended with compromise. Trading
relations with the more important Western partners were not disrupted,
most favoured nations status was renewed, and loan was rescheduled
16.
In early 1980s, strategies and measures invariably reflected the stepped up
extraction drive and forced resource redeployment within the net.
Ceausescu intensified mobilized participation and populist rhetoric and
broadened the capacity of the net to overlap, control and mobilize. Under
this policy the density of interlinking threads grew: one-third of the adult
population had been explicitly drawn into the party membership
17.
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Romania reached the highest ratio (14 percent) of party members within the
population among the socialist countries
18.
For decreasing potential resistance to increased extraction, Ceausescu also
intensified cadre rotation. Rotation intensified overwhelmingly within the
Party Secretariat and the Council of Ministers and among county first
secretaries, especially concerning the strategic fields of production: mining,
petroleum, agriculture and foreign trade. Demotions depended on
Ceausescu’s personal decision.
Also resource extraction was intensified: in 1982 food exports rose by 12.3
percent while import decreased by 66.8 percent.
19 In 1983, in the
framework of the New Financial Economic Mechanism, the minimum
wage was abolished for workers with the introduction of accord global, and
payment was tied to output in physical unit. Also the idea to lay off
workers and closing down entire units was raised in the name of
liberalization
20 ￿ in practice, serving to get rid of burdens.
The drive to repay the foreign debt increased the hardships imposed upon
the population to the extreme. The rationing of electric power reduced the
daily supply in winter to one hour’s worth of a single bar on an electric fire,
and the gas pressure in Bucharest was often too low in winter to permit
cooking. The maximum temperature allowed for factories and offices in
December, was 44 F. Small private plots had to deliver their products to
state procurement offices and could sell surplus goods only at state
determined prices on the "free" market. By 1988 malnutrition, aids,
environmental catastrophe has developed. The use of private cars was
prohibited in the winter months. Restaurants closed shortly after nightfall..
Romanians could only obtain medicines listed on prescriptions for hard
currency or through the services of relatives living abroad
21.
By 1988, the authorities decided to forbid the use of refrigerators, vacuum
cleaners and other household appliances, urging the population to store
food outside during winter time, to refrain from using elevators and central
heating, and so on. Street lighting, which had already been reduced in
1979, was cut off altogether in the countryside, while in cities only the main
streets are (poorly) lit. Inspection teams were set up, and stiff penalties
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were applied to those caught infringing the regulations. Yet, official
propaganda often makes reference to Ceausescu’s rule as the ’years of
light’
22
Also  physical redeployment of a social strata began in the name of
optimization of costs of production: from March 1988 ’systematization’ was
introduced to reorganize the entire countryside by concentrating rural
population in selected villages for optimization of agricultural production,
urbanization and industrialization. Systematization, the liberation of land
for agricultural purposes implied the reduction of the number of villages
from 13,000 to 5-6,000, harming 11 million of villagers. Villages were
administratively merged into larger units. Peasants were to be forced in
collective large buildings (agro-industrial complexes) without pipelines.
23
From the complexes peasants would be bussed out to their collectives or
nearby factories. Empty villages were to be erased and land cultivated for
state farms. No list of the villages scheduled for removal was published,
leaving the countryside in anxiety. Concrete decisions on selecting which
villages to erase were politically rational ￿ for example, minorities were
targeted. Villagers were normally only given a notice of several weeks that
their houses were to be destroyed. They were additionally required to
undertake the work of demolition themselves as free manpower. The
destruction of culture and cultural values and small-holding production
with bulldozers was to be carried out by 2000.
24
Extraction of resources and forced resource redeployment reached even
those to be born. In order to boost birth rate, abortion was forbidden for
both women and livestock.
25
Extracted resources within the net not only served for repayment of foreign
debts and the finance of heavy industry, but also served for grandiose
investments to increase national pride, reflect the triumphs of socialism and
Ceausescu. For that reason, Europe-wide admired historic quarters of
Bucharest, regarded as incompatible with the victory of socialism, were
destroyed, and massive redevelopment works in Neo-Stalinist style,
controlled by Ceausescu himself, were carried out.
26
                    
22 Shafir, 1985, p. 118.
23 Rady, 1992, p. 68.
24  Mark Almond, Decline Without Fall: Romania under Ceausescu (London: Institute
for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1988), 176-80.
25 Rady, 1992, p. 70; Almond, 1992, pp. 182-3.
26 Giurescu and Fischer-Galati, 1998, p. 198; Almond, 1992, p. 153-171.13
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ESCALATION OF FORCED RESOURCE REDEPLOYMENT:
MOUNTING SOCIAL TENSIONS
Plans and implementation of systematization caused rapid alarm throughout
Romania, local rebellions were reported. Accumulating tensions motivated
scattered opposition (alleged military coup, popular protests) that were
brutally put down. Anxiety over systematization combined with foreign
attention and strong opposition gave courage to the dissident intellectual
voices within Romania.
27
The escalation of the structure-conforming methods increased social
tensions to the extreme within the net.  Meanwhile, also the larger
aggregation was shaking, ready to collapse. The consecutive collapse of the
Polish and Hungarian and East German party-states, as sub-units of the
larger aggregation and the non-intervention of Gorbachev to prevent their
collapse, predicted the bloc’s future. Gorbachev’s domestic reforms and
policies toward bloc members evaporated the political capital from behind
Ceausescu’s "threat ideology" and exposed the limits of his power.
Ceausescu however defied all pressures, proclaiming in October 1989 ￿the
eternal validity of his plans￿ for Romania.
28
Mounting social tensions and system collapses elsewhere in the larger
aggregation, paired with the weakened position of Ceausescu from within
and without, provided a window of opportunity and encouraged the
expression of mass grievances.
The spark that soon set fire to the whole country, and where all the above
developments came to a head, was born in Timisoara, a small city in
Transylvania. Mass grievances deriving from a local conflict in Timisoara
were soon turned into blood-shed by Securitate forces ordered by Ceasescu,
who happened to be out of the country at that time, visiting Iran.
29
The Timisoara events were initially concealed from the public, as was the
international breakdown of communist regimes outside of Romania.
However, news on Timisoara also rapidly spread to Bucharest and caused
public excitement. Ceausescu, unable, or unwilling to respond to the crisis,
and possibly unaware of the final risk, turned to the usual instrument: mass
mobilization. He ordered mass demonstrations supporting the system, and
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especially himself, on the main square of Bucharest
30 As usual, about
100,000 workers from all over Romania were transported to the main
square to applaud his speech and cheer. However, in vain he tried to deliver
his talk. He was interrupted each time by the shouting of the crowd that
turned against him. He was soon forced to flee from the building. The
military defied his orders to shoot at the crowd, and so did part of the
Securitate. The remaining faithful Securitate forces were insufficient to
restore order. The party-state collapsed within hours in the face of the
revolution. The National Salvation Front composed by disgraced old
communists, dissident intellectuals and military leaders assumed the
political leadership of the country. Ceausescu and his wife tried to flee but
were arrested and shortly after sentenced and executed by a secret military
tribunal.
31
ADAPTATION EFFORTS IN A SELF-DISINTEGRATING PATTERN:  THE
EXAMPLE OF HUNGARY
The political developments in the Soviet Union in the mid 1980s and,
consequently, Gorbachev’s non-intervention strategy (Bunce, 1993) and the
increased constraints in extracting and attracting resources within the structure
and outside of it, led inevitably to the further weakening of the power
structure’s cohesion in Hungary. Usual scapegoats referring to external
pressure did not function and increasing tensions were no more contained by
the threat of Soviet intervention. This situation further contributed to the rapid
decrease in the readiness to cope through the network both inside and outside
the party.  It increased the space for manoeuvre of those with dissenting
views, the chances for surfacing of intra-party factional differences, and the
emergence of open conflict
32  about the acknowledgement of the crisis
situation and the required solutions.
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE ACCELERATED POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
AND DISINTEGRATION
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The political leadership was reluctant to openly admit to the all-encompassing
character of the crisis. Convertible debts rose from 2 billion of 1975 to 9 bil-
lion in 1980 and to 18 billion dollars in 1987, while the value of convertible
exports stagnated at 5 billion dollars.
33 The younger generation within the
party apparatus - mostly party technocrats - exerted strong pressure on the
leadership to face the crisis, and clearly to establish the conservative leader-
ship’s responsibility for it.  This same pressure was exerted by the younger,
upwardly mobile technocrats within the Communist Youth Federation, the
trade unions, as well as the state apparatus.
34  Independent scientific and liter-
ary circles took advantage of the general uncertainty openly to voice their
criticism. In 1987, supported and fermented by the suggestions on stabiliza-
tion and comprehensive reforms of an expert collective
35, the CC brought
more radical resolutions that already comprised the change in the main ele-
ments of the structure.
36
Resolutions brought in the CC conference in 1987 however, were not
implemented. Nevertheless, overall crisis situation forced the arrangement of
a National Party Conference in May 1988, where those reacting to the crisis
had initiated economic reforms and political ones aimed at democratizing the
party’s organization. Two critical political events occurred at the conference:
one was the removal of JÆnos KÆdÆr from his post as party First Secretary and
his election to party President ￿ a figure-head position. The other was the
dropping of the oldest and most compromised members from the CC
candidacy list, thereby preventing their re-election to the CC
37.
The CC recommended the decentralization of decision-making within the
Party hierarchy. More concretely, to decentralize inter-linking threads
through the decentralization of the nomenklatura, to make inter-linking
threads scarcer through the reduction of the positions on the nomenklatura
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list, and to withdraw inter-linking threads from state activities. The CC also
decided to withdraw D1 lines within the Party hierarchy, for example through
secret ballot in the lower-level party organizations, multi-candidacy, and the
possibility for the direct appointment of delegates for higher level committees.
It emphasized the withdrawal of D1 lines also within the state hierarchy
through the need for freedom of information, for the formulation of the law
on assembly and association, and the abolition of the official trade unions’
monopoly. The decentralization and withdrawal (absolute shrinkage) of the
net was further enhanced by CC conference that announced a turn towards a
mixed ownership structure through the growth of the private sector and
unconstrained market.
38 These measures further undermined inter-linking and
intra-party dependency threads
39, while preparing the ground for the rise of
horizontal coalitions thus far inhibited by the structure.
Central decisions were hard to enforce at lower levels under loosened
cohesion and prevailing resistance. The arrangement of similarly decisive
conferences at local levels became a long drawn-out power struggle, instead
of automatic roll-down, and it took considerable time before they spread
throughout the structure.  For example, in Budapest it took almost a year for
these local conferences to be held. In the counties where the party secretaries
were stronger, the battles degenerated into cruder tactics.  It was not by
chance that at this time corruption within local party organs began to be
revealed throughout the country fuelling the already high level of public ill-
feeling towards the party itself.
40 Furthermore, parallel to the growing
dissatisfaction and increasing crisis, the decentralization of the nomenklatura
system continued.  Fewer and fewer positions were kept on the CC
nomenklatura list.
41 Decentralization was also accompanied by a streamlining
in party committees thereby decreasing feedbacks and through that, resisting
capacities.  This process was combined with the dismissal of many party
secretaries within the enterprises. As a reaction to growing instability and
uncertainty, those newly elected were no longer full-time party workers. All
of them tried to find or keep their civil job within the enterprise. Dependence
of those shifting or remaining in civil jobs became definitive when party
secretaries within the organizations located in the district were also removed
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from the district nomenklatura, thereby withdrawing D1 and D2 lines. Those
who were replaced either left or were given some low-level job within the
enterprise (Interviews).
In July 1988 the CC decided to decentralize the nomenklatura still further,
42
while retaining 435 mostly top leadership positions.  The CC’s decision called
for the further decentralization of nomenklatura responsibilities for the
respective lower levels of the party hierarchy. This tendency was reinforced in
October 1988, when the Budapest Party Committee abolished its whole
nomenklatura list (interview). This action further eroded the districts’
possibility of enforcing their interests.  In this way their positions were further
weakened which resulted in further decentralization.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCELERATED DISINTEGRATION:  SEQUENTIAL
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
As a consequence of the extremely rapid loss of cohesion, and
decentralization, the closed channels along the D2 inter-linking threads
opened. The political capital behind the various regions, activities,
organizations, and decision-makers either partially or totally vanished. The
individual spheres were liberated from the politically monopolized
dependence.  Accumulated tensions which atomization caused by the net had
hitherto suppressed broke loose and came to the surface. As a result,
distortions which had formerly been hidden by the system’s cohesion, and
which were derived from the form-fitting of reform measures, or which were
caused by the effects of political rationality considerations on otherwise non-
political decisions, now came into the open.   
The obvious sign of the breaking threads, the exposed distortions, and the
now uncovered tensions was the significantly increased incidence of
horizontal organizations and the concomitant appearance of pressure groups
of various sizes, either via the utilization of long-forgotten rights within the
traditional institutions, or in spite of these.  These groups presented their
interests and demands more and more forcefully either within official
organizations or inter-organizational circles, or outside of these.
In the course of these events, the party lost all its capacity to influence the
economy. The staff in the party apparatus that was dealing with enterprises
and other economic organizations was left without functions. The only
remaining threads through which enterprise decision-making could be
influenced were those of the instructor system overlapping organizations,
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which was weakened considerably in 1986 and those of the party discipline of
the party members who were in key positions and in weakened party cells
within the enterprise. These, however, proved quite ineffective in an
environment where the nomenklatura as an instrument of existential
dependence ceased to exist and where there were no more resources to
redistribute.
With the breaking of the inter-linking threads the now superfluous party
apparatus itself began to disintegrate.  Simultaneously with this process, all
those feedbacks, which came into being via the utilization of the inter-linking
threads or the D1 dependency threads within the party hierarchy, became
ineffective.  The intensity of the activities within the network shifted from the
traditional inter-linking threads towards those within the state hierarchy.
43 In
this way the continuing weakening of the inter-linking threads changed the
power relations within the structure: it increased the power of the state
hierarchy and the privileged circle narrowed to those that still had remaining
feedback connection to higher levels of the state hierarchy.
The precipitous disintegration of the power structure was further enhanced by
the high-speed withering away of the D1 dependency threads within the party
hierarchy. Parallel with the cessation of the monopoly situation and the
loosening of the cohesion, the intra-party power conflicts also came into the
open, intensified, and spread throughout the party hierarchy.  On the basis of
the interest differentiation within the party, concomitant with the
disintegration of the power structure, the process of political party formation
also began inside the party itself.  Interests were initially manifested as
differences of opinion, then as trends, and later as concrete and competing
platforms.  A party split became imminent.
44
The high speed of disintegration of the party apparatus, its instruments and
functions was shown by the fact that the speed of events was outstripping that
of the decisions. The party apparatus was reduced, and the institution of full-
time party secretary was suspended only when its influence had already
significantly decreased.  The possibility of establishing platforms within the
party began only to be formally declared once the various factions had begun
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openly to establish their individual mass following.  The question of
Communist Party legitimacy was put on the agenda only when the new
parties were already mushrooming.  The legitimacy of the party’s power over
practically every type of social organization and position was put on the
agenda only once a whole host of new, independent associations, trade
unions, economic and social interest groups had been formed without having
inter-linking threads.  Many special concessions to the favoured were only
abolished when there really were only a comparatively small number of
privileges left to go round.  The legal foundations of party organizations
within non-party institutions began to be questioned, once their capacity to
influence and their mediating role had significantly decreased.  The party
apparatus had already lost the bulk of its functions, and its staff were busy
seeking other, non-party jobs, when still no official position had been
formulated on the role of the party apparatus in the given situation.  Finally,
discussion of the issues surrounding the party’s nomenklatura system reached
the agenda when this system was already serving a function opposite to what
had been originally intended. This time the party was no longer governing
resources through the direct connections afforded by the nomenklatura system
but had become, instead, a prisoner of the general crisis situation.
At the high speed of the disintegration of the party￿s power, a further element
of the party-state, the state-monopolized economy began its process of
disintegration. Steps were taken for introducing or extending the rule of law
in economic operation. Several bills were passed concerning economic
transformation. Some of them were passed many years before the collapse,
others passed at the eve of the collapse by the reformist leadership. These
laws were enhancing the disintegration process, easing the transformation and
smoothing system collapse
45. Towards the end of 1988, the inter-linking
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threads were already incapable of overlapping the economic sphere, let alone
the social and political spheres.  In response to all these changes, pressures,
and instability official ideology began to change: the Politburo in October
1988 displayed increasing tolerance towards emerging new political and
economic interest groups. It set very easy criteria for the acceptance of
alternative movements by the party and allowed party members to join these
movements
46. Indeed, the party even offered them political alliance.
At its meeting in early February 1989 the CC accepted the need for political
pluralization and a multi-party system.  At this crucial meeting it made a
historic declaration: it acknowledged that it regarded the events of 1956 not as
a counter-revolution, but as a popular uprising in which the forces of
democratic socialism were also present
47. This announcement retrospectively
called into question the legitimacy of the system, given the bloody repression
of the 1956 uprising with the help of Soviet military forces. At this mid-
February meeting the CC recorded that the HSWP had renounced its claim to
a leading role position, and had declared that it wished to become a political
party. In March the Budapest PC suggested the total abolition of the
nomenklatura system
48.  This same body in April also publicly defended the
developing horizontal organizations of the various kinds of reform groups
within the party
49, though these were incompatible with the principles of
hierarchy. This also led to the reluctant acceptance of the earlier  outright
rejected principle of competing platforms.
In May 1989 the CC initiated the total abolition of the nomenklatura system.
It declared that it wanted to practice its jurisdiction only over party positions.
The other important resolution of this meeting was the reversal of its earlier
decision on the party leadership over the workers’ militia (due to popular
pressure) ￿ which was its armed force established in 1956
50. With these steps
the legitimacy of party groupings within organizations was further weakened,
as was that of the militia. The suggestion to shift the headquarters from
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enterprises to territorial organizations, however, still faced resistance. The
greatest ￿ and well-founded ￿ fear of the party organizations in shifting scope
was that in the event of territorial organization, they would lose a large
proportion of their membership. This fear was well grounded.
During the process of disintegration, amidst increasing internal and external
tensions, the power elite became more and more uncertain of itself and more
receptive to reform pressures from within and outside the net. A reform
committee suggested sweeping changes in economic policy: opening up to
world market and integrating the Hungarian economy to that market, a radical
economic reorientation away from the bloc and from the subordination of the
domestic production to Soviet import interests. The committee also
recommended the democratization of the social and political institutional
system and the reform of property relations, both of which would enhance
popular support.
51
At the behest of the increasingly vocal opposition groups and the internal
opposition of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) itself,
negotiations began in May 1989 between the government and the new
political groupings. The talks gained more and more weight, and legitimacy
gradually shifted from the Parliament to the scene of these negotiations.
Within weeks, the agreements reached here became important items on the
Parliament’s agenda.  No longer could the Parliament debate bills without
these having first been passed and/or amended by this extra-Parliamentary
forum. Noteworthy among these were the amendments to the constitution and
the so-called crucial laws formulated through tough negotiations: the freedom
of information law, the party law, the electoral law, and many other important
amendments to current laws.
52
Following the agreements, the remaining threads holding the structure
together became strikingly contradictory to the accepted changes. During the
first eight months of 1989, 68,000 people left the HSWP, whereas only 2,600
entered, leaving 725,000 party members out of the 790,000 of the previous
year
53. In October 1989, on its last Congress, the HWP was newly formed as a
political party (Hungarian Socialist Party). It entered the parliament after free
elections in early 1990 as a small opposition party bearing one tenth of its
former party members.
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ADAPTATION EFFORTS IN A SELF-WITHDRAWING PATTERN: THE EXAMPLE
OF CHINA
PRE-EMPTING PROCESSES
The acceleration of the self-withdrawing measures began in early 1990s,
after a short period of central retrenchment, and gained impetus in the
second half of the 1990s. The retrenchment was one in the series of the
repeated similar actions undertaken from the end of 1979s, owing to the
dynamics in the given distribution of power, ending up in frequently
hardening reproduction constraints. This move was reinforced by the poli-
tical stabilization drives due to collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Tian-
nanmen event. Acceleration efforts were directed at compensating the
radical economic slow-down that resulted from the previous resource cen-
tralization efforts. The new measures that deemed to revive the economic
activity paved the way for the accelerated transformation of the net.
The party reencouraged the spreading of Township and Village level Enter-
prises (TVEs) that were formerly hindered. This process, while making
interlinking and hierarchical threads denser, indirectly enhanced the growth
of the field outside the net through the TVE￿s activity. The party
acknowledged the existence of a socialist market economy, jettisoned the
central planning as a mechanism for resource allocation. New laws were
passed concerning state owned enterprise (SOE) activity increasing its
decision-making capacity and communication with the market. Authorities
have also set the legal framework for the infiltration of foreign capital into
the net by allowing joint ventures and limited liability companies and
prescribed the transformation of state enterprises into company form. They
also allowed the cutting of economic units from the net through bankruptcy
and the lease or selling off of smaller enterprises, a process that has already
started without central consent.
Despite decentralizations and the increase of the field outside the net,
causing the relative shrinkage of this latter, the reproduction constraints
within the net further hardened due to the pattern dynamics. Consequently,
revenue centralization efforts re-emerged, parallel to the decentralization of
expenses and increasing economic liberalization. In 1994 a major general
tax reform was introduced to redirect resources to the center and
decentralize burdens to the local governments. As a consequence of this
one-off redistributive action the center’s share increased from 22 to 5623
percent.
54 Meanwhile, the distribution of expenditures remained
unchanged.
55 These circumstances further hardened local governments’
reproduction constraints and as a reaction, it accelerated the absolute
shrinking of the net at lower levels
56.
ACCELERATING ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND WITHDRAWAL
By mid 1990’s foreign firms together with rural enterprises already
accounted for more than half of China’s industrial output.
57 Either as green-
field investment outside the net or entering the net, the increase of domestic
and foreign private capital exerted competition pressure on SOEs and
TVEs. The hardening budget constraints of SOEs and TVEs coincided with
their increasingly hardening of reproduction constraints within the net. Due
to the self-reinforcing tendency of the simultaneous occurrence of
hardening reproduction and budget constraints, the absolute shrinkage and
weakening of the net further accelerated. By 1996, partly as a consequence
of the tax reform, partly due to competition pressure outside the net economic
growth was again slowing down: this did not only concern SOEs but also
collective enterprises. Profit rate of collective enterprises (most of them rural):
dropped from 26.5 percent in 1980 to 8.2 percent in 1996, while that of SOEs
dropped from 24.9 to 6.5 respectively
58. Concerning SOEs, after 18 years of
gradual transformation their share in China’s total industrial output has
precipitated from 77.7% in 19978 to 28.8% in 1996
59. The share of
employment in SOEs in 1996 was 57.4% of the urban workers. SOEs
possessed 52.2% of total investment in industrial fixed assets. As a
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consequence of constraints on resource extraction, the share of direct
subsidies to loss-making SOEs in the GDP declined from its 1985 height
(5.66%) to 0.27% in 2001
60. They were losing money, in spite of the large
amounts of implicit subsidies from low interest loans and other policy
protections.
61 Overall, in 1996, 23 percent of the 390,000 enterprises
reported losses
62. Losses in 1996 were suffered by 38 percent of SOEs, 40
percent of large and medium-size SOEs, 60 percent of small SOEs, 18
percent of collectives and 34 percent of "other" enterprises
63.
According to some experts, as a result, at the end of the 1990s, competition
pressure on SOEs reached a new level. It had greater effects on SOEs
supervised by local government than on those supervised by the central
because of local SOEs are frequently in competitive industries where the
non-state firms entered.
64
Cutting off liabilities from the net
Hardening reproduction constraints enhanced by hardening budget
constraints from outside the net accelerated the privatization process. By
the end of 1996 up to 70% of the small enterprises had been privatized in
pioneering provinces. Many provinces have completed the change of
ownership in more than 50 percent of their small and medium sized SOEs
on county level.
65 By 1996 some pioneering counties had privatized almost
all of the state-owned enterprises under local supervision. By 1997, most
counties in the country had progressed to privatize more than half of the state-
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owned enterprises under local supervision.
66 Unfortunately there are no
aggregate data on privatization. We can estimate the scale only from the
reduction of the number of small industrial SOEs. From 1995 to 2000, the
number of small industrial SOEs dropped to its half, from 72,000 to
34,000. The difference is 38,000 that had been either privatized or
liquidated, or merged.
67 The tendency of the privatization is suggested by
the comparison of the tables showing the rate of decline in the number and
employment of SOEs on county, prefecture and province levels in 2000
compared to 1994.
68 The rates of decline decrease step by step upwards the
hierarchical administrative levels
69. This also means that the process is
gradually spreading from smaller to larger enterprises, owing to the fact
that increasing sized enterprises are in general subordinated to increasing
rank of authority. Moreover, reproduction constraints are softening towards
higher ranks and larger enterprises which add to the tendency of upward
spreading.
The 15
th Party Congress in September 1997 took the lead of the above
dynamics. In the Congress Ciang Co Minh declared that state owned industry
should be decreased. He announced that China would be undertaking massive
privatization of its SOE sector.
70 China would privatize 369,000 SOEs.
71 In
fact, this was the formalization and acceleration of the upward spreading
process that begun five years earlier. A report in the official China Securities
in November 2000, citing a survey by the National Bureau of Statistics,
predicted that SOEs would eventually withdraw from most industrial
sectors, while the state would retain control over a few key areas. A state
monopoly should be retained in 15 sectors, including military industries
and electricity output
72
The withdrawal of the holders of dependency lines
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Competitive pressure and efforts to get rid of burdens incited further changes
in the net besides decentralization and cutting off liabilities: also those
holding these lines are disappearing. Empirical survey suggests that by early
2000s either distributive state functions were emptied or organizations
bearing those functions were merged or eliminated at different levels and
aggregations of the structure
73.
The vertical dependency lines within the state sphere of the net became
scarcer (merger of supervising organizations) and have shrunk radically.
The shrinkage took place by cutting functions, organizations, resources and
discretion besides cutting off targets from functions. These developments
occurred at higher and lower levels too. The retained tasks and functions of
the remaining organizations became decentralized along the levels of the
hierarchy and authorities became less interventionist and with decreased
power, for lacking distribution potential.
The interlinking threads of the party towards the enterprises and the state
bureaucracy became also radically scarcer besides many were left in limbo.
The remaining party linkages to the state and SOEs and TVEs ￿ even if
strongly bound ￿ are attached to a weakening state in its capacity of extrac-
tion and distribution within the net.  Both intra- and cross-hierarchy feed-
backs became scarcer and the remaining ones weaker as a result of the
weakening of the hierarchical and inter-linking dependency threads, and the
declining capacity to distribute resources within the net.
New party-state organizations emerged to carry out the self-withdrawal
themselves in the economy. Traditional party organisations are also en-
gaged in leading self-withdrawal at township and county levels by organ-
ising county and township semi-free elections and free elections at village
level.
74
WEAKENING OF THE NET BY INVITING PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ENTER AND
SEEING OFF STATE ASSETS
The competition pressure from outside the net, the hardening reproduction
constraints within the net, incited the drive for accelerated privatization,
closedown and lay-off. However, when foreign or domestic capital entered
the net, it also brought about the weakening of the remaining inter-linking
                    
73  CsanÆdi and Lai, 1993
74 Hairong Lai, ￿Development of Competitive Elections since mid 1990s on Township
Level in Sichuan Province in China￿ China Perspectives. 51 Hong Kong, (2004), 13-27.27
threads connected to the economy. In joint ventures, party secretaries are not
allowed to sit in the board of directors as such. They potentially have a voice
through the trade union, especially since the Party Secretary is often
simultaneously the trade union leader. In Guangdong and the Special
Economic Zones had succeeded in eliminating Party influence or activity. By
1995, in Guandong the Party was essentially absent from joint ventures.
75
Same process is occurring parallel to the withdrawal of state shares in share
holding companies.
76
At the end of the inter-linking and hierarchical lines not only close-down and
privatization puts an end to the concrete function of the hierarchical and inter-
linking threads, neither only private capital entering the net weakens it. An
opposite process is also contributing to the weakening of the net: the fled of
state values by the emptying of the rigid structures. In other words, the
transferring of state assets outside the net through asset stripping went
steadily further. Already in December 1995, the State Administration of
State Property reported that asset stripping in the SOE sector is large.
77 This
process accelerated to such an extent that the State Council formed a
leading group under the direction of then Vice Premier Zhou Rongji to
examine the issue. Assets are being drained through various avenues such
as joint ventures, between state and non-state firms.
78 The process is
reinforced by the continuous flee of individuals with convertible expertise
and competitive enterprise units outside the net.
INVARIABLE MECHANISMS AND RATIONALITY WITHIN THE REMAINING NET
It appears, however, that competition pressures, decentralization,
weakening and withdrawal of the net, does not necessarily imply the
change of rationality and priorities within the remaining net. In the
shrinking net decision-makers adapt with the narrowing of the circle of
those privileged. The prevalence of political rationality and operating
principles is suggested by several factors: the remaining nomenklatura; the
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political selectively of the governments￿ economic policy  orders  to the
establishment of  Large Enterprise Working Committee (LEWC)
79 under the
Politburo to hold the nomenklatura of selected strategic enterprises
80 at central
and lower levels and its gradually accumulating resource distributing
discretions by concentrating the approval of large investments; the political
criteria in the selection of enterprises 601 enterprises for dept-equity swaps
from the 6.600 loss-making ones.
81 Lately, in early 2003, Economic and
Trade Commission (ETC) and LEWC and some sections of the Planning
Office merged under the new name of State Owned Asset Management
Commission.  The merger explicitly concentrated the assets and the
nomenklatura of the most important enterprises.
82 All the above on the one
hand, suggest that the absolute and relative shrinking and weakening of the
net makes the selection stricter but does not change the selection criteria
within it. However, on the other hand, the fact that these enterprises are being
put on the stock market without purchaser constraints provides a further
support to the idea of upward spreading privatization.
The spreading of hardening reproduction constraints within the net, the
competitive pressure by the field outside the net and capital infiltrating the
net and the flee of competitive units and persons outside the net contributes
to  acceleration of the characteristic dynamics. They incite increasing
efforts and simultaneous difficulties of resource extraction on central level,
and with that, to the acceleration of absolute and relative shrinking of the
net on national level. This process, in turn, further accelerates the spreading
of hardening reproduction constraints within the net on lower levels. Due to
this dynamics, while within the net principles of connection of party-state
elements remain unchanged, characteristics that define the principles of
operation of the party-state are vanishing: dependencies, interest
promotion and extraction and distribution of resources are not any more
monopolized and the transformation of the economy is taking place at
growing speed.
CONCLUSIONS
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Through the introduction of a comparative party-state model, and within that,
the thee patterns of power distribution we have demonstrated that the
dynamics of reproduction and instruments of self-reproduction are pattern
conforming. Accordingly, the paths for transformation are also pattern-
conform. The different room for manoeuvre is defined by those structural and
dynamic specifics in time, space, different aggregation and conditions of the
structure. Due to these specific structural and dynamic constraints, the
capacity of party-states to learn or deviate from their path is limited and also
uneven. When external pressure for adaptation increases this escalates the
implementation of pattern-conform measures that accelerates pattern conform
disintegration, collapse and transformation.
The three countries as examples of the three specific patterns of distribution
of power within the IPS model show different degrees of adaptability and
different permissiveness towards adapting efforts that deviate from pattern-
conforming measures.
In the case of Romania, as a system of weak internal resisting capacity of the
actors, the dynamics of the pattern and the dominant, politically rational
strategies worked hand-in-hand to the last breath reacting to persistent
hardening of reproduction and budget constraints. The escalation of
structure conforming instruments (forced resource redeployment) did not
dissolve the system but increased tensions to the extreme, while the slight
move towards economic liberalization was soon form-fitted. Mounting
tensions opened up the system to collective dissent and the lack of adaptive
capacity ended up in drastic system collapse when window of opportunity
emerged.
In the case of Hungary, as a system with strong feedbacks, the persistent pa-
rallel hardening of reproduction and budget constraints increased adaptation
pressures. Efforts to re-centralize economic decisions over resources were
form-fitted to power relations and pressures escalated instead the frequency of
decentralizing reforms, without the capacity to deviate from forced allocation
paths. On account of the difficulties in revealing resources, the impact of the
reforms in conserving the self-supporting mechanism by providing new
resources weakened, whereas their structure-loosening effect strengthened.
The pattern-dynamics overrode strategies: instead of adaptation, the in-
creasing frequency of reforms led to accelerated disintegration of the party,
the wakening of interlinking and hierarchical ties of the party and the emer-
gence of horizontal links of opposition. Escalating reforms could no longer
renew the cohesion of the power structure, but instead they contributed to its
smooth collapse.30
In the case of China, the growing frequency of hardening reproduction
constraints escalated first resource-creating reforms and through that the
relative shrinkage of the net by increasing the field outside of it that mounted
competitive pressures. Competitive pressures further enhanced the hardening
of reproduction constraints within the net that besides accelerating
decentralization and disintegration, it escalated its absolute shrinkage  through
the privatization, closedowns and the transgressions outside the net to get rid
of burdens. With decreasing resources to distribute and extract from within
the net and targets disappearing from the end of the links, state functions and
organizations emptied and were wind up, interlinking threads weakened, were
left in limbo or were withdrawn, shrinking the net absolutely.
All in all, the market competition pressure on party-states through the si-
multaneous hardening of reproduction and budget constraints, enhance
adaptive behavior. However, based on the above, we suggest that adapta-
tion  of party-state systems is self-consuming  since pattern dynamics in-
crease pattern-conform measures rather than adaptive market behavior. The
sequence of self-consuming differs according to patterns: transformation in
Self-exploiting pattern begins with systemic collapse followed by parallel
political and economic disintegration and transformation. Self-
disintegrating pattern begins with disintegration and transformation of the
political power, followed by the transformation of the state and state-owned
economy after systemic collapse. The self-withdrawing pattern starts with
the disintegration and transformation of the state and state-owned economy
parallel to partial-spreading collapses. The limited adaptability point to the
limited learning capacity of party-states, though to different degrees in the
three patterns. Depending on patterns, adaptation efforts end up in in-
creased tensions and violent collapse in the Self-exploiting pattern, in dis-
integration and smooth collapse in Self-disintegrating pattern and in disin-
tegration and withdrawal of the net and thereby partial-spreading collapse
of the net in the Self-withdrawing pattern, while a new system begins to
evolve. Due to specific pattern dynamics, the first two patterns are accom-
panied by economic crisis, the third by economic growth external to the net.
Meanwhile, within the waning net, political rationality of behavior and se-
lection criteria do not change in any of them. Economic policy strategies are
constrained by structural and pattern specifics: they may accelerate or slow
down pattern dynamics but cannot alter it. Alternatives emerge within pat-
terns and not among them. Therefore, tendencies in one pattern do not fore-
cast those in the other pattern.